Protection of individual privacy is a common concern when releasing and sharing data and information. Differential privacy (DP) formalizes privacy in probabilistic terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data intruders, and thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications of DP involve development of differentially private mechanisms to generate sanitized results at a pre-specified privacy budget. In the sanitization of bounded statistics such as proportions and correlation coefficients, the bounding constraints will need to be incorporated in the differentially private mechanisms. There has been little work in examining the consequences of the incorporation of of bounding constraints on the accuracy of sanitized results from a differentially private mechanism. In this paper, we define noninformative and informative bounding procedures in the sanitization of bounded data, depending on whether a bounding procedure itself leaks original information or not. We formalize the differentially private truncated and boundary inflated truncated (BIT) mechanisms that release bounded statistics. The impacts of the noninformative truncated and BIT mechanisms on the statistical validity of sanitized statistics, including bias and consistency, in the framework of the Laplace mechanism are evaluated both theoretically and empirically via simulation studies.
Introduction
Protection of individual privacy is always a concern when releasing and sharing data and information. A data release mechanism aims to provide useful information to the public without compromising individual privacy. Differential privacy (DP) is a concept developed by theoretical computer scientists (Dwork et al., 2006b; Dwork, 2008 Dwork, , 2011 that has gained great popularity in recent years in both theoretical research and practical applications. DP formalizes privacy in mathematical terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data intruders and thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications of DP involve development of differentially private mechanisms, also referred to as sanitizers, through which original results are processed and converted to results that do not reveal individual information at a pre-specified privacy budget. There are general differentially private mechanisms such as the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b) , the Exponential mechanism McSherry, 2009) , and more recently, the staircase mechanism (Geng et al., 2015) , the generalized Gaussian mechanism (Liu, 2016a) , and the adaptive mechanisms such as the multiplicative weighting mechanism (Hardt et al., 2012) and the median mechanism (Roth and Roughgarden, 2010) for sanitizing multiple correlated queries. There are also differentially private mechanisms targeting specifically at certain statistical analyses such as robust and efficient point estimators (Dwork and Smith, 2010; Dwork, 2011) , principle component analysis (Chaudhuri et al., 2012) , linear and penalized regression (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012) , Bayesian inferences of probabilistic graphical models (Zhang et al., 2015) , machine learning, data mining, and big data analytics in genomics, healthcare, biometrics (Blum et al., 2008; Mohammed et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2016; Sadhya and Singh, 2016) , among others.
In the context of DP, it is often assumed that data and statistics (query results) are bounded globally. It is technically difficult to apply DP, at least in some differentially private mechanisms, to perturb unbounded statistics while ensuring some usefulness of the sanitized results. The employment of "global" and data-invariant bounds rather than data-specific "local" bounds is one of the reasons underlying the robustness of DP against the worst-case privacy attack without assuming what the attackers have and how good they are. Some statistics are naturally bounded, such as proportions, regardless of data. In addition, real-life data in general support the assumption of bounded data, providing a practical basis for the applications of differentially private sanitization algorithms that rely on data boundedness. For example, for a sample size, counts and frequencies formed from categorical attributes are bounded. Though numerical attributes might be modelled by distributions with unbounded domains, the distributional assumptions are in many cases only approximate and the probabilities taking out-of-bounds values are small enough to be ignorable under these distributional assumptions. For example, though human height is often modelled by Gaussian distributions with a support of [−∞, ∞] , it is safe to say human height is bounded within (0, 300)cm and Pr(height < 0 cm or > 300 cm) ≈ 0 under the Gaussian assumption. As another example, the number of car accidents per day in a city can be modelled by Poisson distributions with unbounded support [0, 1, 2, . . .), but it is safe to say the number is bounded within [0, c] , where c, the maximum possible car accidents, is a finite number; and Pr(number of per-day accidents in that city > c) ≈ 0 under the assumed Poisson distribution. If all attributes in a data set are bounded, statistics from either descriptive or inferential procedures based on that data set in general are also bounded.
The bounding condition of a statistic can be incorporated when designing a differentially private mechanism. Barak et al. (2007) employed linear programming (and the Fourier transformation) to obtain a non-negative and consistent sanitized contingency tables. Li et al. (2015) investigated an extension to the matrix mechanism they proposed that incorporates nonnegativity constraints when realizing count queries. In the Exponential mechanism, null utility can be assigned to out-of-bounds values so that the probability of releasing illegitimate out-of-bounds values is 0. In other mechanisms such as the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that release sanitized results from the real line (−∞, ∞), some choose to ignore the bounding conditions and release the raw sanitized results whether they are out-of-bounds or not, which is not recommend given that out-of-bounds values carry no practical meaning, or post-hoc "legitimize" out-of-bounds sanitized results before release, such as by setting them at the boundaries or throwing them away and re-sanitizing until a legitimate value is obtained.
There has been little work examining how bounding procedures, while satisfying DP, could affect the utility and validity of sanitized results relative to their originals. In this paper, we take a close and systematic look at the incorporation of bounding constraints in differentially private mechanisms and examine the effects of two bounding procedures on the utility of released data. Specifically, we define noninformative bounding and informative bounding, depending on whether the bounding per se leaks original information or not. We introduce the truncation and boundary inflated truncation/BIT bounding procedures, and demonstrate their applications and assess their impact on the accuracy and utility of sanitized results both theoretically and empirically in the context of the Laplace mechanism with noninformative bounding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the concepts of DP and some general differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the noninformative and informative bounding, and the truncation and BIT bounding procedures. Section 4 investigates the impact of noninformative bounding procedures on the utility of sanitized results in terms of bias and consistency. Section 5 illustrates the applications of noninformative truncation and BIT Laplace mechanisms and examines the statistical properties of the sanitized results in two simulation studies. The paper concludes in 6 with some final remarks and plans for future works.
Preliminaries
DP is defined as follows (Dwork, 2006; Dwork et al., 2006b ): a sanitization/perturbation algorithm R is -differentially private if for all data sets (x, x ) that is δ(x, x ) = 1 and all possible result subset Q to a query q, log
≤ , where δ(x, x ) = 1 denotes that data x differs from x by only one individual, and > 0 is the privacy budget parameter. Query q is a function operated on a data set, which is used exchangeably with statistic s in this discussion. Under DP, the probabilities of obtaining the same query result from x and x after sanitization via R are about the same -the ratio between which is bounded within (e − , e ) -a neighborhood around 1. DP guarantees individual privacy protection at a given since the chance a participant in the data set will be identified based on query results sanitized via R is very low given that the query results are about the same with or without that individual in the data set. DP provides a robust and powerful model against privacy attacks in the sense that it does not make assumptions on the background knowledge or the behavior on data intruders. can be used as a tuning parameter -the smaller is, the more protection there is on the released data via R. In addition to the -DP, there are softer versions of DP, including the ( , δ)-approximate DP (aDP) (Dwork et al., 2006a) , the ( , δ)-probabilistic DP (pDP) (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008) , the ( , δ) random DP (rDP) (Hall et al., 2012) , and the ( , τ )-concentrated DP (cDP) (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016) . In all the relaxed versions, one additional parameter is employed to characterize the amount of relaxation on top of the privacy budget . In ( , δ)-aDP, Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) ≤ e Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) + δ. A sanitization algorithm satisfies ( , δ)-pDP if the probability of generating an output belonging to the disclosure set is bounded below δ, where the disclosure set contains all the possible outputs that leak information for a given privacy tolerance . The ( , δ)-rDP is also a probabilistic relaxation of DP; but it differs from ( , δ)-pDP in that the probabilistic relaxation is with respect to the generation of the data while it is with respect to the sanitizer in the ( , δ)-pDP. The ( , τ )-cDP, similar to the ( , δ)-pDP, relaxes the satisfaction of DP with respect to the sanitizer, and ensures that the expected privacy cost is and (Prob(the actual cost > )> a) is bounded by e −(a/τ ) 2 /2 . The Laplace mechanism is a popular sanitizer to release a query result with -DP (Dwork et al., 2006b) . Liu (2016a) introduces the generalized Gaussian mechanism (GGM) ( , δ)-pDP that includes the Laplace mechanism as a special case (when p = 1 and δ = 0). The Laplace mechanism and the GGM are based the l p global sensitivity, which is defined as δ p = max
for all pairs of data sets (x, x ) that are δ(x, x ) = 1. δ p is the maximum possible difference in s defined in terms of the l p distance between two data sets x, x with δ(x, x ) = 1. The sensitivity is "global" since it is defined for all possible data sets and all possible ways of these two data sets differing by one record. The larger the GS is for s, the larger the disclosure risk is from releasing the original s, and the more perturbation is needed for s to offset the risk. Specifically, the Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s r×1 as in s * r×1 = s + e, where e comprises r independent draws from Laplace distribution Lap 0, δ 1 −1 , where δ 1 is the l 1 -GS of s. For integer p ≥ 2, the generalized Gaussian mechanism (GGM) of order p sanitizes s with ( , δ)-pDP by drawing sanitized s * from the GG distribution f (s * ) = r k=1
,k , and δ 1,k is the l 1 -GS of s k and δ p is the l p -GS of s. When p = 2, the GGM becomes the Gaussian mechanism of ( , δ)-pDP that generates sanitized
2 ) for k = 1, . . . , r. When r = 1, there exists an analytical lower bound on σ, (2 ) −1 δ 1 (Φ −1 (δ/2)) 2 + 2 − Φ −1 (δ/2) that satisfies ( , δ)-pDP; when r > 1, numerical approaches can be applied to obtain a lower bound on σ (Liu, 2016a) .
The Exponential mechanism is another popular sanitizer of -DP , and is based on a utility function of all possible outputs to a query and the sensitivity of the utility function. Denote by u(s * |x) the utility score of output s * given data x. S is the set containing all possible outputs s * , and δ u = max
|u(s * |x) − u(s * |x )| is the maximum change in score u between two data sets x and x with δ(x, x ) = 1. The Exponential mechanism of -DP generates s * from distribution exp u(s * |x) 2δu
if S is discrete, and exp u(s * |x) 2δu
if S is continuous.
The Exponential mechanism can sanitize bounded statistics directly by sampling from the distribution in Eq (1) with a predefined bounded domain S. The Laplace mechanism and the GGM produce unbound sanitized results from the real line (−∞, ∞); as such, some bounding procedures will need to be in place if they are to be applied to sanitize bounded statistics.
Bounding of Statistics in Differential Privacy
In this section, we categorize a bounding procedure in the context of DP, depending on whether it leaks original information or not. We also formalize two commonly used bounding procedures in the context of the Laplace mechanism to set up the framework for the examination of the statistical properties of sanitized outcomes from these procedures in Section 4. Definition 1. A bounding procedure is noninformative and data invariant if an application of the procedure does not reveal information that pertains to the original data set. A bounding procedure that leaks information of the original data is referred to as an informative and data dependent procedure.
If a noninformative bounding procedure is applied to bound sanitized results, then we can spend all privacy budget on sanitization, with our mind at ease that the actual total privacy cost is kept at , the prespecified privacy budget. If a bounding procedure is informative, then the privacy costs from the sanitization and bounding procedures should sum up to be ≤ , which can be difficult to validate since the actual privacy cost of the bounding procedure might not easy to quantify. In other words, noninformative procedures should be employed if the total privacy cost from an informative bounding procedure cannot be accurately assessed.
We formalize two noninformative bounding procedures in the context of Laplace mechanism. Both are intuitive and effective, and have been employed in practical applications of differentially private sanitizers to release data. The extensions of both procedures to other differentially private mechanisms (such as the GGM) are straightforward. . . , r), the privacy budget by , the l 1 -GS of s by δ 1 , and let λ = δ 1 −1 . a). The truncated Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s by drawing s * from the truncated Laplace distribution
b). The boundary-inflated-truncated (BIT) Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s by drawing
Both the truncation and BIT procedures can be either informative or non-informative, depending on whether the bounds [c 10 , c 11 ] × · · · × [c r0 , c r1 ] at which the truncation or BIT occurs are data invariant or not. The truncated Laplace mechanism can also be realized via in a post-hoc manner by throwing away out-of-bounds differentially private sanitized results from the regular Laplace mechanism, which can be computationally expensive compared to direct sampling. Similarly, the BIT bounding procedure can be realized by post-hoc setting out-of-bounds sanitized results from the regular Laplace mechanism at the corresponding boundaries, which is the preferred way to sampling from the BIT Laplace distribution. If the scale parameter λ → ∞ in the Laplace distribution as either → 0 or δ 1 → ∞, it can be easily proved that f (s i ) in the truncated Laplace mechanism in Eq. (2) converges to an uniform distribution unif(c 0i , c 1i ), and that in the BIT Laplace distribution in Eq. (3) converges to a Bernoulli distribution with probability mass at c 0i and c 1i , respectively. In both cases, the sanitized results preserve little original information. The Laplace and BIT Laplace mechanisms, as in the regular Laplace mechanism, require calculation of the l 1 -GS of targeted s for sanitization. GS in general needs to be determined analytically though the value might not be tight; numerical computation of GS is not feasible since it is impossible to enumerate all possible data x and all possible ways of δ(x, x ) = 1 especially when x contains continuous attributes, or when sample size n is large. We have obtained the l 1 GS of some common statistics, including proportions, means, variances, and covariances (see the online supplementary materials). It should be noted that the GS of a function of a statistic s is not equal to the function of the GS of s in general. For example, δ 1 of a sample variance is (c 1 − c 0 ) 2 n −1 , but δ 1 of the sample standard deviation (SD) cannot be simply calculated as (c 1 − c 0 ) 2 n −1 . In fact, the GS of the SD is more difficult to calculate analytically compared to that of the variance. When the GS of s is not easy to calculate, but a data-independent function of s, say t = f (s), is, we can instead sanitize t to obtain t * and then obtain sanitized s * via the back-transformation s * = f −1 (t * ).
Statistical Properties of Sanitized s *
In Definition 2, the bounds [c 10 , c 11 ] × · · · [c r0 , c r1 ] need to be data invariant and global in order for a truncated or BIT bounding procedure to be noninformative. On the other hand, by ignoring the local properties of data x, a noninformative bounding procedure could have an impact on the statistical properties of sanitized results s * . In this section, we investigate the statistical behaviors of s * produced by a sanitizer with bounding constraints. We start with defining what statistical properties of sanitized s * would be desirable.
Definition 3. Sanitized s * is unbiased for the original s if E(s * |s) = s. s * is asymptotically unbiased for s if E(s * |s) → s as n → ∞, where n is the sample size of original data x. s * is consistent for s if
When s is boundless and sanitized by the regular Laplace mechanism, then s * is unbiased for s since E(s * ) = s per the definition of the Laplace distribution. If δ 1 ∝ n −k , where k > 0, then s * is also consistent for s. When s is bounded and sanitized via the noninformative truncated or BIT Laplace mechanism, we will have biased s * unless the noninformative bounds are symmetric around the original s. Proposition 4 presents the magnitude of the bias of s * relative to s in the noninformative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms, respectively, and a sufficient condition for s * to achieve consistency for s. The proofs of Proposition 4 are provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 4. Let [c 0 , c 1 ] be the global bounds on a singular s, λ be the scale parameter, s be the location parameter of the Laplace distribution, µ 1 be the expected mean of the truncated Laplace distribution f (s * |s * ∈ [c 0 , c 1 ]), and µ 2 be the expected mean of the BIT Laplace distribution 
and
b) µ 1 µ 2 > 0 (µ 1 and µ 2 are of the same sign) and |µ 1 − s| ≤ |µ 2 − s| (s * sanitized via the BIT Laplace sanitizer is no more biased than that via the truncated Laplace sanitizer). c) s * sanitized via the truncated Laplace sanitizer or the BIT Laplace sanitizer is asymptotically unbiased and consistent for s if the scale parameter λ approaches 0 asymptotically.
If [c 0 , c 1 ] are global bounds, it is unlikely to have unbiased sanitized results in real-life applications via the truncated or the BIT Laplace mechanism per part a) of Proposition 4 as [c 0 , c 1 ] are fixed while s changes from data to data. To achieve unbiasedness for s * , local bounds that depend on specific data sets can be constructed, but at additional privacy cost. For example, bounds [s − min(s − c 0 , c 1 − s), s + min(s − c 0 , c 1 − s)], which are symmetric around s, can be used to bound sanitize results in the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanism. However, since the bounds are functions of the original s, they will leak information about s, which has to be accounted for towards the total privacy cost. Though sanitized results via sanitizers with noninformative bounding might be biased for the original results, they can still enjoy desirable asymptotic properties such as asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency as n → ∞ under mild regularity conditions per part c) of Proposition 4. In the framework of truncated Laplace and BIT Laplace mechanisms, the scale parameter of the associate Laplace distribution λ = δ 1 −1 . With pre-specified, the only link between sample size n and λ is δ 1 . To satisfy the condition λ → 0, δ 1 needs to → 0 as n → ∞. Intuitively speaking, as n increases, the influence of a single individual on an aggregate measure of a data set is likely to diminish, and the individual is less prone to be identified from releasing the aggregate measure. Translated to the GS of the aggregate measure, it means δ 1 decreases with n. δ 1 of some commonly used statistics, such as proportions, means, variances and covariances, are ∝ n −1 (online supplemental materials), by per part c) of Proposition 4, the sanitized copies of these statistics via either the truncated or the BIT Laplace mechanisms are consistent for their original values.
Proposition 4 examine the statistical properties of sanitized statistics s * relative to their original values s; Proposition 5 presents the conditions for s * to be unbiased, asymptotically unbiased, or consistent for θ when s are estimators for parameters θ in a model underlying the original data. The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 5. If s, the target statistics for sanitization, are estimators for parameters θ from a statistical model, and . a) if E(s * |s) = s and E(s|θ) = θ, then E(s * |θ) = θ. b) if E(s * |s) → s, and either
Proposition 5 implies that a desired statistical property of sanitized results relative to the true parameters can be achieved in two steps. For example, if the desired statistical property is consistency, then the first step is to choose an estimator s that is consistent for θ, which should be relatively easy to complete given that unbiased and consistent estimators are well studied in statistics; and the second step to use a sanitizer that generates s * that is consistent for s.
Simulation Studies
We conducted two simulation studies to demonstrate the applications of the noninformative truncated and BIT bounding mechanisms and examine the statistical properties of the sanitized results. In the first simulation, we sanitized a variance-covariance matrix, and focused on the rate of the sanitized results approaching the original as the sample size increased and the comparison between the truncated and BIT truncated Laplace mechanisms on their influences on the sanitized results. In the second simulation, we sanitized proportions and focused on the inferential properties of the sanitized proportions by examining the bias, root mean squared errors (RMSE) and coverage probability (CP) for the true proportions based on the sanitized results.
simulation study 1
In this simulation, we applied the non-informative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms to sanitize a 2 × 2 variance-covariance matrix S of two variables in a data set of size n. The constraints in the sanitization of a covariance matrix are that the marginal variances are positive and the correlations are bounded between [-1, 1] . Additionally, the marginal variances are also right-bounded for bounded data from which S is calculated. depended on S * 11 and S * 22 , the latter two were already sanitized; therefore, bounding procedures for S * 12 using information S * 11 and S * 22 did not incur additional privacy cost. We examined three different specifications of (S 11 , S 22 , r) at (1, 1, 0), (1, 2, −0.4), and (1, 2, 0.7), respectively; and set the global bounds [c 10 , c 11 ] at [−3, 3] and [c 20 , c 21 ] at [−3, 3] , [−4.5, 4.5] , and [−4.5, 4.5], corresponding to the 3 specifications of (S 11 , S 22 , r). The total privacy budget was set at = 1. Since 3 statistics were sanitized on the same set of data, the sequential composition principle applied (McSherry, 2009), and we needed to divide the total privacy budget among the 3 statistics. There were infinite ways to allocate the total budget to the 3 statistics, and we used equal allocation in this simulation; that is, each sanitization received 1/3 of the total budget. We also investigated a wide range of sample size n ranging from 50 to 800. At each specification of S and a given n, 500 independent sanitization was carried out so we could examine the distributional properties of the sanitized results.
The results are presented in Figure 1 . In each plot, the original results, and the mean, and the 2.5%, 25%, 75% and 97.5% percentiles of the sanitized results are presented. The main findings are summarized as follows. First, when n was relatively small, there was noticeable mean deviation of the sanitized results from the original results, except for S 12 and r when r = 0 (the boundaries were symmetric about the original results and thus there was no bias per part a of Proposition 4). Second, the sanitized results generated via the truncated Laplace mechanism were more biased than those via the BIT Laplace mechanism, consistent with part b of Proposition 4. Third, as n increased, both the deviation (bias) and the dispersion of the sanitized results approached 0, consistent with part c of Proposition 4. Lastly, since the scale parameter of the associated Laplace distribution in both mechanisms was large when n was small, more sanitized results were set at the boundary values in the BIT mechanism (especially for the marginal variance and correlation), and the distribution of the sanitized results became flatter in the truncated Laplace mechanism.
simulation study 2
In this simulation, we aimed to release proportions p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) of the four levels of a categorical variable ( 4 k=1 p k = 1). Since each proportion queried a disjoint subset of the data (no overlapping information), per the parallel composition principle (McSherry, 2009) , the sanitization of each proportion received the full budget . We examined 3 different specifications of (0.1, 0.5 and 1) and a range of sample size from 50 to 500. 500 multinomial data sets, each sized at n, were simulated from multinomial(n, p = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4)). The sample proportionsp were calculated in each simulated data set and were sanitized via the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms respectively. The bounds [c 0 , c 1 ] were [0, 1] and δ 1 = n −1 for each proportion. Since each proportion inp was sanitized independently, it was very likely that the sum of 4 sanitized proportions, denoted byq * k for k = 1, . . . , 4, was not equal to 1. Therefore, we normalizedq * k as inp * k =q * k ( 4 k=1q * k ) −1 and released the normalizedp * . A single set of sanitized proportion was released for each examined simulation scenario. We calculated the bias, RMSE, both of which were relative to the true p, and CP of the 95% confidence interval (CI) of the true p based on the sanitizedp * . The bias, RMSE, and CP based on the sanitized results were compared to those based on the original p.
The results are presented in Figure 2 and summarized as follows. First, there was minimal bias in the sanitizedp * when = 1 and = 0.5 regardless of n and the bounding mechanism; and there was some bias at small n when = 0.1, especially for the smallest proportion p 1 = 0.1 (positive bias) and the largest proportion p 4 = 0.4 (negative bias). Consistent with Proposition 4, the BIT mechanism yielded less biased sanitized results than the truncated mechanism. Second, the RMSE was inflated in the sanitized results compared to the original RMSE, which was expected considering the noise introduced during the sanitization step. The larger the privacy budget or the larger n was, the smaller the inflation was. Though the BIT mechanism led to smaller bias compared to the truncated mechanism for small n when = 0.1, the RMSE values were larger in the former than the latter in this simulation. Third, there was undercoverage for p 1 = 0.1 and p 4 = 0.4, which spanned a wider range of n and got more severe as decreased (the empirical coverage was around 95% at all n when = 1, worsened to 85% ∼ 92% for a wider range of n ∈ [50, 300] when = 0.5, and further deteriorated to 50% ∼ 80% across the whole range of n ∈ [50, 500] when = 0.1). The BIT Laplace mechanism also had worse undercoverage than the truncated mechanism at small n for = 0.1.
The undercoverage can be resolved to some degree by using the multiple synthesis (MS) technique in DP (Liu, 2016b; Bowen and Liu, 2016) . The MS takes into the variability introduced by the sanitization process by releasing multiple synthetic data set. In this simulation, for each original result at each simulation scenario, 5 sets of independently sanitized results were generated, and the inferences were combined over the 5 synthesized sets using the rule given in Liu (2016b) . However, in order to maintain the -DP, each set was sanitized using 1/5 of the total budget per the sequential composition theorem. The results are given in Figure 3 . The CP improved significantly from releasing multiple synthetic data sets, especially in the case of the BIT mechanism. However, due to the decreased privacy budget per synthetic set and the bounding, the sanitized results were much noisier and the biases were noticeably much larger, even after averaging the sanitized results. For example, in the case of the truncated mechanism when total = 0.1, the bias never diminished to 0 and the RMSE never reached the original RMSE levels within the examined range of sample size n.
Discussion
We have introduced the concept of noninformative and informative bounding in the sanitization of statistics with finite bounds. We have investigated the impact of noninformative bounding on the statistical properties of sanitized results in the context two modified Laplace mechanisms for bounded statistics -truncated and BIT -both theoretically and empirically via simulation studies. Both the noninformative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms produce biased sanitized results unless the noninformative global bounds are symmetric around the original results, which is a hard-to-satisfy condition in real life given than the original statistics change by data while the global bounds are fixed. However, sanitized results can be consistent for model parameters if the scale parameter of the Laplace distribution with the truncated and BIT Laplace sanitizers approaches 0 as data sample size n increases, and if the original statistics are consistent estimators for the parameters.
Though the BIT Laplace mechanism in theory delivers less biased sanitized statistics than the truncated Laplace mechanism, the former does not seem to be more advantageous over the latter in practical applications, factoring in the following considerations. First, asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency hold under the same regularity conditions in both mechanisms and there is little difference between the two when n is large. Second, the truncated Laplace distribution is a smooth distributional while the BIT Laplace distribution is discrete and comprises of 3 pieces. Though the distributional shape might be irrelevant in the release of a single sanitized statistic, it will matter in some differentially private data release mechanisms such as the model-based differentially private synthesis (modips) approach (Liu, 2016b) . Last, the discrete 3-piece distributional shape of the BIT Laplace distribution requires the intervals of the outcomes to be closed on both ends so that the boundary values are exclusively defined. This is not necessary for the truncated Laplace distribution where the density function is continuous and smooth. This last point seems trivial but can be annoying in practical applications. For example, in the first simulation, closed-intervals [0, (c 1 −c 0 ) 2 n/(4(n−1))] and [−1, 1] were applied to variance and correlation, respectively. Some sanitized outputs were exactly 0 for variance, and exactly -1 or 1 for correlation from the BIT Laplace mechanism. In practice, these values are rare occurrences due to measurement errors and noises, and users may choose to reject the sanitized results exactly at the boundary values. If the users demand more plausible results that agree with real-life situations, the decision of using what values to replace the implausible boundary values becomes arbitrary and could also potentially affect the statistical properties of the sanitize results. Those concerns do not exist in the truncated Laplace mechanism. This paper has focused on the applications of the truncated and BIT bounding procedures in the framework of the Laplace mechanism of -DP. The bounding procedures are general enough to be extended to other differentially private sanitizers with unbounded numerical supports, and to the soft versions of DP, when sanitizing bounded statistics; and the statistical properties of sanitized results from these extended applications will have to be examined case of by case.
Supplementary Materials
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